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iUN 8 REm 
The Video Debate Rages: 
Chief Justice Stephens responds to Judge Lester 
Also In This Issue: Schizophrenia 
after again receiving and waiving 
"'iranda rights. 
The Issue before the Court was 
whether Springs' waiver of his 
Fifth Amendment rights was i nva lid 
since the police refrained from 
telling him at his inItial interrer 
gat Ion that they intended to Ques-
t ion him about the murder. The 
Court held that It was not. n I WI e 
hold that a suspect's awareness of 
all possible subjects of Ques-
tioning in advance of interrogation 
is not relevant to detennining 
whether the suspect, vo I untar i I y, 
knowingly, and intelligently waIved 
his F i Uh Amendment pr iv i lege. 
Justices Marsha ll and Brennan 
dissented based on their vi .... that 
"a suspect's decision to waive th is 
FI Uh Amendment! pr iv i lege wi II 
necessarily be influenced by his 
awareness of the scope and ser ious-
ness of the matters under ;"vesti-
gation. 1f 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Martin .!.!. Ohto 
40 CrL 3297 
(February 25. 1987) 
The issue before the Court In 
Martin was whether Ohio could place 
on the defendant the burden of 
proving her defense of self-protec-
tion at her trial for "aggravated 
murder ." The i 5SUS arose because 
of an apparent uoverlapll in Ohio 1 s 
definitions of aggravated murder 
and sel f-protection. A conviction 
of aggravated .,urder required that 
the accused have acted "purposel y, 
and with prior calculation and 
design," while a finding of self-
protect ion required that the ac-
cused not have created the s j tua-
t Ion resu I t I ng j n the death and 
that she bel i eved she was in II immi-
nent danger of death or great 
bod i I Y harm." Proof of the se I f-
protection defense would thus 
LEXIl'GTON HERALD-LEADER 
Salurday. January 24. 1987 A6 
effectively negate a finding of the 
mental element of the aggravated 
murder Charge. In 
York, 432 U.S. 
Court he I d that a 
Patterson 2 .!!!!.. 
197 ( 1917) , the 
defendant may be 
reQuired to prove an affirmative 
defense if the affirmative defense 
does "not serve to negat I ve any 
facts of the crime which the state 
is to prove in order to convict of 
murder." The majority in Mar"tin 
concl uded that the above language 
in Patterson did not benefit Martin 
because the state court's instruc-
tions "did not require Mrs. Martin 
to disprove any element of the 
offense with wh ich she was 
charged. It Just jces Powsl , , 
Brennan, MarShall, and Blac""'un 
dissented • 
linda West 
Assistant Public Advocate 
Appellate Branch 
(502) 564-5234 
6th Amendment outweighs 
desire to protect children 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE COLLEGE 
KenllJCty Attorney General Do,iII 
AnnstttrIg has gone aD the .... r UI the 
U.S. SUplome Coon _ bis CODt .... 
lion that doleodanlS in child abuse 
cases do DOl have the rigbt to conIroct 
their I<XUSers in 51lID. pre!riaI bear· 
ings. WhiJe AnnstroIt&'s moIive -
pn>l~ allegedly .- cItiIdreD 
from in.timidatioD - is twnmendabie 
bis JegaI reasooiag cIoesD' seem samci. 
The case Annstrat& is pInlIiog 
iDwlves • 1984 cmvictitD '01 a maD 
accused 01 semaIIyallusi!lgl.llOJii.Is. 
The KO!IbICIcy Supmne Coon .,..,.. 
turned !be CODVictioD because !be de-
lemant .... barred from alt<Dding • 
bearing to determine if !be "'" girls, 
oges 1 IOd 8, ... en compet"" to 
testify. 
AnnsInJag CODIeDds !bat .mce !be 
dolen:lan! was able to c:onfrmt bis 
acatsers at the trial itoell, be .... DOl 
deltied bis am1i1tllioual rigIIts. "' .... 
than 20 SUtes have filed briefs _!be 
U.S. SIlp.-e Coon in S>JppOrt of Ibis 
UJUIOOIIt. w!Ucb Annstrat& sa)'S *""' the .. Iionwiele support Ill< _ 
lfCting victims 01 child _. 
That may be DUe, IOd .... WllUId 
DOl ........ the ~ !bat these 
victlms .- to be pn><ecl!d to !be 
IUIIeSI mem possible. But neither the 
weIibt 0/ public opinioo ..,. the need to 
protect victims can 0YeI'ride !be ri&bts 
atfonled to """'Y American _ 
UDder the U.s. CmstiMioa. 
ODe at _ righlS is outliDed in !be 
Sixth Ametldme!Il. whicb says, "!JI aD 
~ proseaaiaIs. !be accused 
shaD enjoy !be rigItl ... to be CODfnlot· 
ed _ !be .ntnesses ~ bim ... " 
The Si.Jlb .AmeDdmeat. as we read it 
(1Od appareruIy as !be Kentucty SU-
premo Coon read it). makes 110 dis-
tinction """""'" proIimiDary bearings 
IOd tria1s. The rights 01 !be accused 
ertend to !be bearings. And !bey 
siltlIJd, sira many CTUCiaI decisions 
are made in socIt bearings. 
The Sixth _t .... added 
to the CmstitutiOll to prtJYide Ameri-
cans .nil> """" pn:>tectiat apfnst 
!abe accusations IOd maIidous 
aJtioo. It .... a wise aGdilion ::'i; 
DOW an integral part at !be American 
S)'SIe!II 01 justice. If 1m accuser • ......, 
an accuser wbo is • cbiJd. is pn>lected 
from _ling !be aa:used, !be judi-
cial system can be used to geoen.te 110 
end of mischief tar an individual lor 110 
adler n!lISOI than that _ e!!e 
dislikes him. 
The Constitution is • tiYing ~ 
ment o.nd lherefore subject UI iIIlerpre-
tation. BIn sud:! interpre<atial _ 
be ..- wi1h !be utmost calIDOII, 
lest ... _ the doc:t!meoJ tt>l!IIlting-
less. If we stan mUing eztrpIirm to 
the dvil Iibomes ggaraoteei by !be 
Cutstitutioo. eztrpIirm cliaated by 
DDIIm1& toore 5Od>stan1iaI than !be -
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Post-Conviction 
Law and Comment 
Confrontlng Rap. ShIeld 
I. Introduction 
As a woman applaud Kentucky's 
passage of a rape shield law; as a 
criminal defense attorney I deplore 
ft s weaknesses. What was once a 
humi I i at i ng exper i ence for the 
victim In a sex offense is now an 
unnecessary denial of a defendant's 
right to present an effect i .. e 
defense. 
Rape sh ield was born of Victorian 
".,ral ity and an abusive criminal 
Just ice system that put the victim 
on trial instead of the defendant. 
Often, the comp I a I n I ng "i tness was 
forced to defend attacks on her 
chast i ty as her sex life was pa-
raded before the jury by a defen-
dant attempting to prove she con-
sented. Such evidence was deemed 
relevant by the specious logi c that 
1 f s he consented once" she'd con-
sent again, and If she didn't con-
sent, she must have been asking for 
it. HisTo~ical Iy. in Kentucky as in 
most states, evidence of a rape 
victim's prior sexua l history was 
automatically admissible at trial 
on the issue of consent. Moreover, 
such evidence could be proved by 
either reputation or specific acts. 
On the other hand, in the past the 
stakes were al so higher for "those 
accused of rape. ~t only was there 
a danger of false accusations, but 
In many instances he death penalty 
could be Imposed. 
Obviously, in our sexua lly act ive 
society the old rat ionale can no 
longer be justified; consent to 
sexu81 re lat ions with partners of 
onels choice is not an indica'tion 
of whether the complaining witness 
would consent to sex with the 
defendant. In response to this need 
for reform and our changing 
society, most states passed rape 
shield laws that limit or prohibit 
a defendant's ability to present to 
the Jury, ev idence of the victim's 
past se"ual history with third 
parties. ~w under Kentucky law , 
such ev .idence is automatically 
inadmissIble so lely because it 
involves a sex offense instead of 
S00l9 other cr ime. I nstead of 
de81 jng with the abuses engendered 
by unbridled JUdicial discretion, 
we are faced with an Inflexible 
legisl ative mandate that deprives 
the trial judge of all discretion. 
The Kentucky legislature, in its 
zea I to protect the vi ct ims of sex 
offenses, enacted a statute that 
abso I ute I y exe I udes a II ev i dence of 
"sex:ua' conduct and habi tsll between 
the complaining witness and any 
person, other than the defendant. 
KRS 510.145; Smith.!.!. Commonwealth, 
Ky. App., 566 S.W.2d 181 (1978). 
Indeed, Kentucky's rape sh i eld 
statute e"cludes the complaining 
witness' prior sexual history with 
third parties whether relevant or 
not, and d i sa I lows BY i dence of 
either reputation or specific acts 
at a tr I a I i nvo I vi ng a se" offense. 
The Kentucky leg is lature has seen 
fit to viol ate a fundamental rule 
of statutory draft i ng; never say 
never. In doing so, the statute i s 
more than a shield that protects 
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the vict;." it is an impenetrable 
w811 that denies one accused of 
such a cr Jme from present i ng even 
critical evidence. 
Unlike the federal rule, Fed. R. 
Evid. 412, which reQuires the 
admission of chastity evidence, if 
"const itutionally required," Ken-
tucky's law does not contain such a 
judicial safeguard. Surely, such a 
blanket exclusion that fails to 
af ford the defendant even the 
opportunity to establ ish the rele-
vance of the evidence, despite the 
fact it may be more probative than 
prejudicial in its impact, cannot 
be reconciled with the s ixth amend-
ment. Surely, such a blanket exclu-
sion will sooner or later prohibit 
the I ntroduct ion of a compel ling 
set of facts that demand the Jury' s 
hearing. To say that sexual history 
i s irrelevant begs the Question. 
The Question i s whether such evi-
dence is relevant in ~ instance; 
whether the sh i eld law prevents the 
defendant from introduc i ng such 
ev j dence; and, whether that exe I u-
sion i s constitutjonal. 
The legislature simply cannot 
foresee or list a I I of the 
circumstances that may ar i se in the 
courtroom gi ven the pess j bi lit i es 
of human conduct. The I egi s I ature 
cannot predeter~ine by statute, the 
fact spec i f ic quest ion of what 
evjdence is relevant and 
admissible. E .. entual ly, the statute 
will violate a defendant's due 
process right to confront witnesses 
and to compel testimony, and in 
doing so, present evidence "Ital to 
his defense. 
The boundar i es of Kentucky's rape 
shield la" ust be challenged. The 
const I tut iona l I I nes need to be 
dravn and defined. IIhile the sta-
tute may be facially constitu-
tional, Smith, supra, there will 
COlll8 a time when i t j s 
uncons~~~u~ional in Its app l i-
cat Ion. See State ~ Howard, N.H., 
426 A.2d 457 (198 I ). There wi l l 
cerne a time .men the law fa i I s to 
correct ly balance the compet ing 
1 nterests of the rape victim and 
the accused. 
This article wi l I att ... pt to 
prov i de a format for ana I y zl ng and 
eva luating the constitut ional 
dImensions that ineVitab l y will 
arise under the rape s hield 
statute. By examl n i og the 
constitutiona l requir9lT1ents of the 
sIxth amendment and focusing on t he 
purpose for which prior sexual 
history i s offered by the defen-
dant, one can anticipate those 
instances where the statute mu s t 
yield to the constitution. 
II. Statutory Mechanics 
To date, over 46 jur isdictions have 
enacted rape shie ld laws that 
el im i nate the trad i tional rule of 
automat ic admissibility. However, 
the laws vary in their substantive 
and procedura I prov, S Ions. Of 
these, approximately 30 jur is-
dIctions a llow the defendant to 
show ;n a spec ific case, at an in 
camera hear ing before the trial 
Judge, that such evidence i s rele-
vant and s hou Id be admitted. See, 
Tanford and Boccll Ino, Rapa Vi ct ims 
Sh i e l d Laws ..!..!:'.. the Sixth Amendment, 
128 U.Pa .L.Rev. 544 (1980). Never-
theless, tha Kentucky legislature 
has enacted the most restrictive 
type of shield statute. ~. 
The Kentucky statute applies to al I 
sex offenses, including att9lT1pts 
and conspiracies, except for 
incest. It absolute ly prollibits the 
i ntroduct ion of the pr ior " sexua I 
conduct or hab i ts" of the 
complaIning witness in the fo rm of 
reputat ion or specific acts with 
parties other than the defendant. 
KRS 510.145; Smith, ~. 
The only two except ions to this 
rule of general inadmiss i bility 
are: "evidence of the comp lainIng 
witness' prior sexual conduct or 
habi ts wi th tile defendant" ; and, 
"evidence d i rectly perta ining to 
the act on whjch the prosecution is 
based." KRS 510.145(3). Even in 
this si tuation, an offer of such 
proof requires the trial judge to 
determi ne the re I evancy of the 
evidence before its ad mi ssion. 
Accord I ng I y, at least two days 
prior to tria l , the defendant must 
alert t he court, by a "ritten 
motion. that there will be an offer 
of ev i dence of the prosecut i ng 
witness' prior sexua l hi story. 
Then, in order to ascertain the 
admissibil ity of the evidence, the 
court must hold an in camera 
hear i ng to determi ne that "the 
offered proof i s relevant and that 
its probative va lue ootweighs its 
i nflammatory or prejudicial 
nature." KRS 510.1450) (b). 
Wh ile it is c lear that relevant 
evidence of a prior sexual rela-
t ionsh ip between the defendant and 
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the compll!llning witness is ad .. is-
sible on the i ssue of consent. 
Bix ler ~ Cocnmonwealth, Ky . App., 
712 S.W.2d 366 (1986). Kentucky 
a I so allows the admi ss ion of rele-
lIant ev idence lid j reet I y pertain lng 
to the act on which the prosecution 
Is based." The exact mel!lning of 
th i s broad language 1s unclear, and 
it is an untested area of the 1 aw 
that must be creative ly challenged. 
Under this exception, the defendant 
can produce ev jdence that another 
person comml tted the cr ime or that 
as the result of the act with 
another, the comp l ai ning witness 
suffered trauma, is diseased or 
pregnant. In other words, the 
defendant can i ntroduce relevant 
evidence whleh exp lains l!I physical 
fact which is i n evidence at the 
trial. Unfortunately, these two 
except ions do not cure the const i-
tutional deficiencies that .... y 
arise in any given factual situa-
tion on the admissibil ity of prior 
sexual acts of the prosecuting 
wi tness. 
III. A Defendant's Sixth 
..... nd .. nt Right to Present 
Relevant, Non-PreJudlcjal Evidence. 
The right of a defendant to present 
evjdence of the prior sexua l his-
tory of the comp laining witness Is 
grounded i n the sixth amendment. 
The constitutIona l mechanisms 
avai lab le to the defendant to 
present such ev i dence are cross-
exa,"i nat ion of the witnesses 
aga i nst him, Pointer v. Texas, 380 
U.S. 400, 404 (1965), and the 
right to cal l witnesses in his own 
behalf. This right to compel testi-
mony encanpasses not on I y the 
subpoena power but the right to 
present defense testimony. Wash-
Ington ~ Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 











Burger ~ California, 
314 , 315 ( 1969). Thus, 
together the tvo clau ses guarantee 
the defendant ~he .- i ght to present 
not on I y a defense but a fu I I and 
ef fective defense. 
These constitutional rights are not 
absolute. Chambers ~ Mr ss i ss ippi, 
410 U.S. 284 (1973). It is a funda-
menta I concept of I aw that sta t es 
may l eg i s latively estab li sh their 
own ru les of evidence, and even 
exclude relevanT evidence to insure 
fairness and reliability in the 
fact- finding process when ascar-
taining guilt or innocence. ~., at 
302. 
Howeve.-, regardless of t he genera l 
legislat ive power, the s tate may 
not infringe upon the 
const itutional rights of a defen-
dant . Kentucky's rape sh ie l d law. 
in its abso lute exclusion of toe 
camp l a intog witness· prior sexual 
history with th i rd part ies, direct-
ly impl icates a defendant' s s ixth 
amendment .-1 gilts to offer ev j dence 
that is logically relevant and 
necessary to the defense. By deny-
ing the defendant the abi I ity to 
pursU9 a certain line ot ques-
tion i ng on cross exam i nation, or to 
elicit certa in testimony fran h i s 
own witnesses, the Kentucky rape 
sl> lei d I aw casts a dark shadow over 
these constitutional protections. 
In fact, two state courts noted 
that such blanket exclus ions con-
flict with a defendant's constitu-
tional right to present a defense 
if the defendant i sn' t afforded an 
opportun Ity to estab l ish the re l e-
vanCe of the proffered ev I dence at 
trial. State v. Howard, supra; 
State ~ De la.der, 104d. App., 344 
A.2d 446 (1975). 
Si noe the abi I i ty of the accused to 
present re l evant ev Idence i s 
grounded in a constitutiona l right, 
a federal constitutional standard 
must be app lied to resolve the 
inevitable conflict between the 
evidentiary rules and state poli-
cies that exclude such evidence a nd 
the de fendant' s right to present a 
defense. The Uni ted States Supreme 
Court developed such a due process 
ba la nCing test in Chambers ~ 
Mi SS i ss i pp i , supr a, a nd expa nded it 
in Dav is ~ Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 
(1974) , a nd United States v. Nixon, 
4 18 U.S. 683 (1984). This test 
balances the state interest in 
exclud i ng tile ev idence aga inst a 
defendant's constitutiona l right to 
introduce such evidence. If the 
state in terest supporting the 
e videntiary exc lus ion does not 
outwe igh the defendant's need for 
the evidence or the probative va lue 
of the evidence excluded, it cannot 
be reconcHed with the constitu-
tional requirements of the sixth 
amendment and a fair trial. There-
fore. the state po li cy excluding 
the ev idence must give way to the 
defendant's right to introduce i t. 
In Chambers 2 Mjssissippi, supra, 
the Supreme Court he ld that Mi ss i s-
s ippi' s "voucher" a nd hearsay ru les 
must yi eld to a defendant's due 
process rights where the defendant 
has de!lX)nstrated that the ev idence 
is both cr i tical and rei iable. 
Cha~bers was convicted of murdering 
ZII po li ce of tI cer. However, another 
person had confessed this murder to 
tl\e po lice. ,t,t tr i a I, the prosecu-
tor refused to ca I I the confessor 
to the stand forc I ng Chambers to 
ca ll him in defense. On d i rect 
examInation, the witness admitted 
confess i ng the cr ime to the pcl ice, 
but on cross-examinat ion by the 
prosecutor, he den j ed the kil Li ng. 
Chambers was prohi b i ted from 
cross-examining t he confessor 
further, because of the common law 
ru Ie that Hone may not impeach hi s 
own witness." 'breover.. the 
Mis.sisslppi hearsay 'rul e prohibited 









had heard the 
admit to the 
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The Uni ted States Supreme Court 
reversed Cha!llbers' conviction 
finding a sjxth amendment viola-
tion. The Court held that the state 
had placed the "integrity of the 
fact-finding process in jeopardy. " 
~ at 295. Th e Court add91:l that 
although s ixt h amendment righ ts are 
"not absol ute aM may, in appro-
priate cases, bow to accommodate 
other l egit imate i nterests in the 
crimina l tria l process#" t he Con-
st !tut ion mandates the state 
Interests be closely scrut i nized. 
.!!!.. Therefore, the Court conc I uded 
that the s t ate's interest in rei i-
ab le ev idence cou l d not prevai l 
over the defendant's need for the 
9vj-dence. 
In Davis ~ Al aska, supra, the 
Supr ... e Court held that the right 
of confrontat ion was paramount to 
the state's pol i cy ot shielding and 
protect i ng a juven il e offender. 
Alas ka had enacted a juvenile 
shield statute that exc luded evi-
dence of a juvenile's cr im ina l 
record in any proceed i ng. In Dav is, 
the state's only identificat ion 
wi tness was a juvenll e who was on 
probation at the time the defendant 
was accused of comm i tting certain 
cri~s. Even though some of the 
stolen property was recovered near 
the juveni le's house, the defendant 
was prevented from cross-examin ing 
the juvenile i n re lation to his 
probationary status by the statu-
tory Juvenile s hi eld law. The Court 
found that the evidence was rele-
vant "for the purpose of suggesting 
that Ithe juvenile l was biased."and 
had a motive to lie • .!!!.. at 311. 
Although the court ac know ledged the 
sta t e's "legitimate and important 
interests" in Juveni Ie rehabili-
tation, the Court he ld that the 
defendant's sixth amendment right 
of confrontation was greater than 
the ldent if i ed state interests • .!!!.. 
In striking this balance the Court 
dec lared: 
IWle conclude that the 
state's desire that Ithe 
juvenllel fulfill his public 
duty to test ity free frOt'll 
embarrassment and with his 
reputation unblemished must 
fall before the right of the 
petitioner to seek out the 
truth in the process of 
defending himself. 
~. at 320. 
Thus. Oavls stands for the general 
proposition that a defendant has a 
right under the confrontation 
clause to expose the bias and 
interests of a wItness, and that a 
state can't constitutionally re-
strict that effort. 
While In ChMlbers the state in-
terests were advanced by a common 
law rule of evidence, and in Davis 
a statutory rule, in United States 
~ Nixon, supra., the interest was 
constitutionally based. 
In United States v . Nixon, the 
Pres id ent refused to del iver tapes 
whether or not the Kentucky rape 
shield statute violates a defen-
dant's right to cross-examine 
"itnesses and cOOlpel testImony. 
Such an analysis requires first, 
the threshold determination ot 
whether the evidence offered by the 
defend~nt is relevant, and second, 
a balancing of the defendant's need 
for the evidence jn a specific fact 
situation versus the state Interest 
in exc luding the evidence. 
sought by the Watergate prosecutor ~------------------------------__ ___ 
by asserting that they were 
privileged preSidential communica-
tions. The Supreme Court, In 
resol.lng this constitutional 
showdown, weighed the preSidential 
priv ilege of confidentiality 
aga I nst the Watergate defendants' 
s ixth amendment rights to con tron-
tatlon and compulsory process. ~ 
at 711. The Supreme Court held that 
the President's "weighty" interests 
in confidential ity " ust yield" to 
the rights of the Watergate defen-
dants. ~. The Court stated that 
the President's Interest was merely 
"general In nature, " wI1 i Ie the 
defendants Interests were "speel fic 
and central to the fair ad judi -
cat Ion of a part icu I ar. .case in 
the administration of just ice ." 
~. 
With these cases as constItutional 
foundation, one ust Question 
Clearly, in ~st cases, evidence of 
a complaining witness' prior sexual 
history with third parties wi II be 
jrre' evant,. but not rnevery case. 
Professor Lawson states that "an 
Item of evidence--ao evidentiary 
fact--is relevant when it renders a 
"",terial ulth""te fact more proba-
ble or less probable th,," It ..auld 
be without the rt8lll." R. Lawson, 
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 
! 2.00 (1984). See al so 0'8r len :!..!... 
Massey Fergerson, Inc., Ky ., 413 
S.W.2d 891, 893 (1967). It is 
impossible to detenoine statu-
torily, the thousands of circum-
stances that may arise where the 
prior sexual hi story of a com-
plaining wi"tness may be relevant, 
and where the probat I ve va I ue of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect on the jury and the 
prosecut I ng witness. This Is the 
-16-
major constitutional flaw in Ken-
tucky's rape sh i eld l aw. While such 
a situation will arise only in the 
unusual case, the legislature can 
not establ i sh a bright line rule 
that paints relevance in blacks and 
whites. By definition, the concept 
of rei evance must be viewed on a 
continuum. At one end of the scale 
the evidence is clearly irrelevant, 
at the other. c learly relevant. It 
is the function of the t 'rjal judge 
to determine t his relevance on a 
case-by-case basis, excluding even 
relevant evidence for pol icy 
reasons .. bere its pro bat i ve val ue 
I s outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect, and admitting such evidence 
where Its probative value outweighs 
the prej udici al impact. Yet, Ken-
tucky's law does not contain this 
j ud lci al machan ism. 
IV. Due Process Balancing 
lind Rape Shield 
Fraraed in the context of the 
Chambers I ine of cases, the Ques-
tion becomes whether or not the 
prior sexual hi s tory of the CClGl-
plaining witness may ever be proba-
t he of an i ssue that j s mater la I 
to determining the gul It of a 
defendant charged with a sex crime. 
Certainly, there will be some cases 
where chastity ev idence is directly 
related to .. hether the complaining 
witness consented to a sex act with 
the accused. After dete~in'ng that 
such evidence is relevant and would 
aid in the fact-finding process, 
one lIust look to the reason for 
which the evidence is offered to 
detemine whether the defendant's 
right to present a fu ll defense 
overrides the state's policy of 
excluding such evidence. 
The art lcu I ated po Ilcies that 
s upport the rape shield law are 
""'"y. The law protects the dignity 
of rape victims, and thus, encour-
ages the report ~ ng and prosecut ion 
of sex cri~s. Furthermore, the 
sh ield law protects victims from 
embarrassment and humi Ilatfon. In 
other ..ards. the rape shield law 
protects the victim's right to 
personal privacy in the area of 
consensual sexual act Ivity. Simi-
larly, the statute a ids in the 
truth find j ng process by exc I uMng 
evidence that Is unduly infl"",ona-
tory and prejud ieial. It has been 
stated that jurors react emo-
tionally to evidence of a com-
plaining witness' past sexual 
history. Such evidence distracts 
the jury frail determining whether 
the prose cut ion has proved the 
crime because the evidence preju-
d ices the Jurors toward the prose-
cuting witnes s, and so. affects the 
outcome of the tr lal. However, the 
state also has an interest tn 
protecting the defendant from false 
accusat ions by untr uthfu I wi t-
nesses. In its aboot-face concern 
for the complaining witness, Ken-
tucky has failed to sufficiently 
protect, as the Constitution re-
quires, the one accused of the 
crime. 
In Davis v. Alaska, supra, the 
Supreme Court recogn Ized that the 
juven ile sh i eld law was a valid 
legislative statement of publ ic 
pol icy. However, this po licy was 
forced to yield in the face of a 
more compelling pot icy; the defen-
dant's right of cross-examination 
to show possible biases, preju-
dices J or ulter ior moTives. Indeed, 
under Davis, the state's interest 
In exclusion mu st be suff ici entl y 
compelling and probaTive, and the 
value of the offered ev idence 
sl ight, to Justify the exclUSion. 
One can Imagine several fact pat-
terns where the prior sexua l his-
tory of the complaining witness 
with third pertles would be crucia l 
at trial. One can easily construct 
scenarios that would require the 
admission of s uch evidence on 
constitutional grounds. A couple of 
exa~ples It lustrate this point. For 
Instance, constitutional questions 
arise where there i s evidence of a 
pattern of prom! scuous sexua I 
conduct or prost i tut ion under 
sl ~il ar circumstances to the case 
at hand. Other constitutional 
questions arise when the defendant 
seeks to adm't the wi tness' pr ior 
sexua l history to show bIas, preju-
d Ice. or undue motive that wou I d 
affect the credibility of the 
witness' testimony that she did not 
consent. See State :!..!... De I auder, 
~. 
Several rape shield statutes In 
other states recognize as relevant, 
evidence of prostitution or indjs-
cr imlnate sexual conduct. These 
statutes admit such testimony 
following "n in camera hearing to 
assess the probat i ve va I ue of the 
evidence versus its prejudicia I 
effect. See foil nn. Stat. Ann.. ! 
609.347; Neb. Rev. Stat. !! 28-321 
to 323; and Fla. Stat. Ann .. ! 
794.001(2). Indeed, a Minnesota 
case applied the Com8On ev identiary 
standard of "comrnon sch ...... or pi an" 
in a sex case. State :!..!... Hi II, 
Minn., 244 N.W.2d 731 (1977). 
'1 rules of evidence are -to be 
llniformly applied, what distin-
guishes a pattern of promiscuous 
sexual conduct on the part of the 
prosecuting witness, from the 
common law doctrine that a ll ows the 
introduct ion, against the defen-
dant, of pr ior bad acts or cr imes 
to show a common scheme or pi an, 
motive, or intent. Indeed , thi s i s 
the evidentiary rule In Kentucky. 
Ev Idence law i s praml sed on the 
not ion th"t rules of ad,. i ss ibll ity 
do not develop differently for each 
substantive cr ·ime, -but rather focus 
on issues common to all tria ls . 
Yet, Kentucky' s rape shield law 
sets a stricter standard of admis-
s ibility of evidence on the consent 
iss ue than it does on the issue of 
forced intercourse. 
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While evidence regarding the past 
sexua I mi sconduct by the accused 
with third parties is admissible In 
some instances, Kentucky's rape 
shield law absolutely bars the 
admission ot such evidence es to 
the v!ctl.. and third parties. 
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky. , 685 
S.W.Zd 549 (1985) held: 
Evidence of independent 
sexual acts between the 
accused and persons other 
than the victim are adllis-
sible if such acts are simi-
lar to that charged and not 
too remote in time provided 











Indeed, under Ke ntucky's statute, 
the defendant i s prohibited from 
introdUCing evidence of prostitu-
tion by the complaining witness, or 
other test il1lOny to show the witness 
had engaged in sexual practices 
with persons simi lar to the defen-
dant under simi lar circlJlllstances. 
This distinction cannot be consti-
tutionally justified. Even when one 
examines the s t ate ' s interest in 
protecting a sex v I ct im by keepl ng 
potentially prejudicial information 
from the Jury, the state's genera I 
interest cannot preva) I where the 
defendant's need in the evidence is 
specif ic and legitimate. Oavis :!..!... 
Alaska, supra; U.S. 2 Nixon .. 
~. 
Another examp I e where the rape 
shield law clearly effects a defen-
dant's right to present probative 
evidence to the jury is premIsed 
upon the holding in Davis v. 
Alaska,~. Davis held that the 
confrontation clause was violated 
by Alaska's refusa l to permit the 
defense in cross-examining a cru-
c .ial witness "to show the existence 
of possible bias and prejudice." 
~., at 317. In a later case, State 
~ fbward, N.H., 426 A.2d 457 
( 1981 ), the New flaOlpsh i re Supreme 
Court held that a defendant accused 
of statutory rape must be given the 
QIlportun i ty to demonstrate that due 
process requires the Introduction 
of a victim's prior sexual history 
I n a part icu I ar case, where the 
probative value outweighs the 
preJ ud i cia I effect on the com-
plaining witness. Relying on Dav) s 
~ Alaska, supra., the Howard court 
stated, 
In seeking out the truth in 
defending hiOlsel1, the defen-
dant mus t be afforded the 
right to present evidence and 
cross-examine witnesses In an 
effort to iOlpeach or dis-
credit their credibility, and 
to reveal possible 'biases, 
prejud Ices, or ulterior 
motives of "the witnesses as 
they "",y rei ate d I recti y to 
i ssue.s or personalities in 
the case at hand. 
••• Strictiy construed, our 
state rape shield statute 
prec I udes an accused frolO 
mak i ng any show i ng that the 
victim's prior sexual acti-
vity has a bearing on any of 
these factors. 
..!..!. at 460. 
The Howard court found the statute 
constitut ional on its face, but 
unconstitutional in Jts app l i -
cation. 
Kentucky courts have also demon-
strated a sensit iv ity to evidence 
whi cll tends to establ ish bias, 
prejud ice or IDOt i ve to l ie. In 
Parsley::!..!.. eo..rronwealth, Kyo 306 
S ..... 2d 284 (1957), the court 
observed, 
The interests of a witness, 
either friendly or un-
fr i end I y, in the pros9Cut Ion 
or in a party is not colla-
teral and may always be proved to 
enable the jury to estimate 
credibility. It OIay be proved by 
the witness' own testl~ny upon 
cross-examination or by Independent 
evidence. 
Id.at 285 
See also Cl ark ::!..!.. ComlllOnwealt~, 
Ky., 386 S.W.2d 458 (1965). 
These are on I y two examp I es _here 
the const itutionality of Kentucky' s 
rape shle!d law is subj ect to 
cha I I enge. By focus ing on the 
purpose for .. hich the evidence is 
offered, one estabJ ishes the rele-
vance of the test lmony as "e I I as 
probative value or potential preJu-
dice to the truth fj nding process 
itself. Pobreover, by delDandlng an 
~ ~ hearing before the trial 
court, on ev idence automatica lly 
excluded by t he s hield statlJte, one 
can set the stage for appe l late 
review on issues ~ith great consti-
tutional ilOpl jcations. 
V. Conclusion 
As a general proposition, the 
frequency of the COIOp la i n j ng wi t-
ness· prior sexual experience does 
not normally show a tendency to 
consent or an inability to be 
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truthful. Nevertheless, the Ken-
tucky rape shield law ",ust be 
constitutionally challenged in its 
abso lute prohibition of evidence of 
the prosecuting witness' sexual 
relations with third parties. The 
Kentucky courts OIust be given the 
apportu,,; ty to construe the statute 
so as to uphold the constitutional 
rights of the defendant while 
creating the least possible inter-
ference .ith the legislative pur-
pose ref I ectad in it. This can be 
done by utilizi.ng traditional 
retevancy ana lysis, ~.e., whether 
the offered evidence "",kes the 
truth or falsity of the disputed 
fact ..,re or less like I y. I f the 
evidence is relevant, the Davis ~ 
Alaska, supra, balanCing tast must 
be ... p loyed to weigh the state's 
interest that rape shield was 
designed to protect against the 
probst j ve va I ue of the exc t uded 
evidence. We !DUst continually 
Question the statute's failure to 
provide the defendant with a proce-
dural mechanism or QIlportunity to 
demonstrate before the tr i a l Judge 
that due process requ ires the 
admi ss ion ot pr ior sexua I history 
ev ldence because the pro bat ive 
value in this case outweighs its 
prejudicial impact em the com-
plaining witness and the Jury. 
Un I ess and unt i I such a procedure 
is estab lished by the Kentucky 
courts, the sixth a ... ndment rights 
of a cr Jm i ns I defendant accused of 
a sex crime will always be at risk. 
In narrow1 y frami ng the issue to 
the tria l judge, through a written 
motion, and requesting an in ca~ra 
hearing on the relevance of such 
evjdence, we can preserve tor 
appellate review the aLJtomatic 
exclus ion of evidence that could 
change the outCOll>9 of t he tact-
finding process. 
Alii son Connel I y 
Assistant Pub lic Advocate 
Nor·thpoint Office 
(602) 236-9012 (ext. 219 ) 
6th Circuit Highlights 
BATSON HEARINGS 
In United States '!..:.. Davis, F.2d 
40 cr.L. 2358, 16 S.C.R. 3,8 
( '987), the 6th Circui t reviewed the 
procedure one federal trial court 
followed in dealirq with a Batson 
challerqe. Durirq voir dire, defense 
counsel objected to the goverrment's 
use of peremptory challerqes to re-
move black jurors. When the defense 
established a prima facie case of ra-
cially motivated exclusion of blacks 
from the jury panel, the trial court 
allowed the prosecution to explain 
the reasons for its exercise of t h e 
ch alle rqes in an in camera heari rq • 
After the heari rq, the court corclud-
ed that the prosecution was justified 
in exercisirq its challerqes but 
would not disclose on the record what 
transpired duri rq the heari rq. 
The Sixth Circuit held that the right 
to be present at trial, under the 
Constitution am federal rules, was 
not violated by the exclusion of the 
defemants and their counsel from the 
in camera hearirg in which the 
prosecution explained its peremptory 
challen:Jes. The Court stated that 
orce the defense had established a 
prima facie case of racial motivation 
sufficient for the trial court to 
make i IXIUiry of the prosecutio n, 
there was nothi I'lJ more for the 
defense to do and their participation 
was no lorger necessary for the trial 
court to make its determination. 
The Sixth Circuit limited its 
decision to this case alone and 
expressly declined to establish 
general procedures to be followed 
when a Batson challen:Je arises. 
Donna Bo~'C'e 
BLIND STRIKE PEREMPTORIES 
The 6th Circuit found ro Sixth Amelrl-
ment violation in the blim strike 
method of exercisin:J peremptory chal-
lerqe in United States ~ Mosely, __ 
F.2d , 40 Cr.L. 2364, 16 S.C.R. 3, 
11 (1987). Under the blim strike 
method, both the defense am prose-
cution exercise their peremptories 
simultaneously without benefit of 
knowirg who the other side is strik-
irg. The Court noted that sirce the 
true nature of the peremptory chal-
lerqe right is to reject rather than 
se lec t po te ntia I jurors, the mere 
simultaneous exercise of challenges 
does not impair the accused 's rights 
under the Sixth Amendment. 
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL 
Counsel for one of three jointly 
tried co-defendants experienced an 
unexpected schedulirg conflict durirrj 
the presentation of the prosecution's 
case. As a result of the conflict, 
counsel '.r.iS unable to cross-examine 
the prosecution's first witness (the 
victim) but informed the trial court 
he would be satisfied with any 
cross-examination conducted by co-
c'lefendant's counsel. The client's 
objection to proceedirq in her 
counsel's absence am her request for 
a new attorney were denied. The Sixth 
Circuit held that defense counsel's 
absence from the trial proceedi n:J s 
wa.s per se prej udicial am: rot 
subject to a harmless error analysis. 
Donna Boyce 
Assistant Public Advocate 
Major Litig ation Section 
(502) 564-7340 
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